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STATE ORGANIZATION AS A POLITICAL INDICATOR
To rephrase an old saw, evaluating the character and orientation of
political regimes requires that analysts pay close attention to what they do
and look like, rather than what they say or claim to be. More precisely,
informed analysis of national political systems involves understanding in
detail the structure and function of their respective economic, military,
political, and social frameworks. For those with a policy-making role, this
provides an opportunity to get a more precise "fix" on the nature and
objectives of foreign regimes, which in turn permits them to frame or tailor
their approaches towards these regimes according to the specific conditions of
each case. More often than not, it has been an inability to grasp the
intricacies and idiosyncracies of foreign political systems that has led
policy-makers to adopt approaches based on erroneous assumptions or
conclusions that result in the exacerbation, rather than the amelioration of
existing international differences.
The ability to accurately assess and forecast the character of foreign
political systems has become a particularly acute concern in recent years, in
light of the overthrow of seemingly stable regimes in number of countries and
the emergence of sub- and supra-national actors such as terrorist or
irridescent groups, religious extremists, and/or revolutionary or nationalist
movements that threaten to dramatically alter the political and economic
"rules of the game" and the basic character of governing regimes in a variety
of countries. This concern has even spawned a new growth industry, in the
form of political risk analysis for both the public and private sectors.
The convergence of pragmatic and scholarly interests in the field of
foreign area studies and international relations has traditionally led the
national state as a major social actor, then turn to a discussion of how study
of national state organization can provide an important analytic tool for
students of comparative politics as well as policy-makers.
Over the last thirty years, the study of comparative politics has moved
from a broad concern with the general characteristics of national political
systems towards a more specific interest in identifying variables that exert a
conditioning, when not determining influence over the character and course of
national political development. Modes of production, relationship with and
role in the international economy, class conflict, political parties, wars
(either civil or foreign), leadership styles, ethnic and cultural diversity --
these are just some of the range in variables that &re claimed to play a major
hand in shaping the character of national political systems. As such, they
are given much attention by the academic and policy-making communities alike.
Within the last two decades, attention has turned towards political
regimes as intervening variables whose nature and objectives have an
immediate impact on the general structure and orientation of national
political systems. As the collection of economic, political, and social
actors that gain control of the reigns of government, political regimes
exercise a profound influence over the countries they rule. Their very
character is believed to represent a manifestation of the ongoing tensions,
struggles, and changes experienced by a society, with regime change repre-
senting the formal shift in status and relationship of a variety of contending
groups and actors. Depending on factors such as their method of gaining
power, ideological orientation, political support base, social origins,
economic, political, and social objectives, and use of coercion, a number of
different regime types have been identified, of which liberal and social
democratic, military and personal ist authoritarian, and religious or party
that all regimes enjoy an equal capacity to alter the role, functions, and
structure of the national state apparatus. What this does imply is that the
impact of contextual factors and systemic variables such as class or ethnic
conflict, economic conditions, foreign relations, and more general demographic
trends on the national state apparatus are most often, albeit dissimilarly,
filtered through the ideological and pragmatic policy lens of the political
regimes that hold direct control over it. As a result, the national state
apparatus behavioral ly and organizationally reflects the relationship of
political reigmes with their respective societies. That is, the structure of
the national state apparatus responds closely to the nature and thrust of
regime objectives, which in turn revolve around the circumstances surrounding
its ascension and tenure in power, its conception of what society should be,
the way it proposes to organize society in order to achieve this vision, and
the capacity of other social actors to assist or resist the pursuit of regime
objectives. Over time, the structure of the state apparatus also is
sequentially influenced by regime change and the feed-back generated by
society in response to their different objectives and programs. Here again,
even this variated feedback is most often filtered by regimes before being
translated into reorganizational efforts within the national state apparatus.
Hence, the very nature of organizational roles, functional objectives, and
structural frameworks, as well as the definition of areas of priority within
the national state apparatus, are all a direct reflection of the political
regime that controls the apex of the state.
Even so, why should political analysts and policy-makers concern them-
selves with the seemingly labyrithian details of national state organization
in order to discern regime character and intentions? Do not such tools as
organizations are variably structured in different countries, and they may be
embedded in one sort or another of a constitutional -representative system of
parliamentary decision-making and electoral contexts for key executive and
legislative posts. "5 We might add that they are integral elements of non-
representative and non-competitive political systems as well.
Most immediately, the national state apparatus represents the
organizational manifestation of a regime's basic program of action, which at a
minimum includes the economic, military, political, and social spheres. As
the main instrument for the application of regime programs, the structure of
the national state apparatus provides the most concrete indicator of what
their objectives are t since implementation requires an organizational capacity
to do so, and since organizational change tends to come after substantial
deliberation and is less susceptible to disguise or quick reversal. In
addition, while certain regimes may suspend the activities of policy-making
branches of government such as the legislature and judiciary (i.e. narrow the
apex of the state), and/or limit the input of groups outside the regime, the
implementory branches of the state -- that is, central administrative agencies
such as ministries, departments, secetariats, bureaus and councils, as well as
important decentralized, semi -autonomous, or quasi-public entities such as
state enterprises, research centers, etc. -- remain as the principal forum in
which regimes attempt to translate policy objectives into programs of action.
Finally, the range and complexity of the tasks performed by the national
state apparatus guarantee that it will represent the highest form of indigenous
organizational expression in most national political systems (particularly
in later-developing countries), and that it will therefore be able to
mobilize the largest amount of resources in pursuit of regime objectives. For
all these reasons, the national state apparatus is the institutional framework
has often been used as a benchmark for measuring political development. 7
However, while this may be an accurate indicator for stable political systems,
it is far less certain that the same is true for unstable political systems.
The reason for this is because, as Weber noted, at its highest level the
state evolves politically as well as functional ly. 8 We have mentioned that in
all societies the national state and its specialized agencies become the
principal objective of contending political actors, since the state is
considered to be the primary vehicle for the achievement of the economic,
military, political, and social goals of those who gain control of the reigns
of government -- that is, the apex of the state. In stable political systems
characterized by regime continuity, however, "rules of the game" governing the
competition between social groups and political actors are the product of a
long and complex process of social group interaction (i.e. conflict or
cooperation over time) that culminate in the establishment of a fundamental
set of guidelines that in turn codify the basic character of the political
system. Here the state serves as the guarantor and regulator of the political
and socio-economic parameters of society, enforcing through legal norms and
offical coercion social group adherence to the established "rules of the
game. "9 Institutional reform within the national state apparatus is therefore
predicated upon an abiding interest in dynamic systems maintenance, which
precludes dramatic structural alterations that could lead to transformations
in the "rules of the game" and basic parameters of society.
This should not be construed to mean that significant structural
alterations within the national state apparatus do not occur in stable
political systems. As Theda Skocpol has pointed out when discussing notions
of state autonomy in advanced industrial democracies, "the very structural
potentials (for autonomous state actions) change over time, as the
endeavoring to reorganize and reorient the state in order to impose a
framework that is more amenable to their particular, and often very opposed
objectives. Regardless of the form of regime change -- revolution, coup
d' etat, voluntary withdrawal from power and subsequent elections, etc.
-- one likely result in all such instances is the promulgation of substantial
institutional reform programs designed to promote new rules and better prepare
the national state apparatus for the pursuit of new regime objectives in
designated areas of major concern. Organizational change is most noticeable
after a transfer of power occurs (often violently) between regimes with
significantly different or opposed objectives, such as in the case of the
Somoza and Sandinista regimes in Nicaragua and the Pahlavi and Khomeini
regimes in Iran, to cite but two recent examples. In any event, the national
state apparatus in unstable political systems sequentially reflects the
dissimilar projects of different regimes, which has a decided influence on
both its short-term organization and its long-term development.
The basic point to be stressed is that in all national political systems
shifts at the level of national political authority are frequently evident
in organizational change within the national state apparatus. The more
profound the shift (i.e. regime rather than government change), the more
significant the reforms that are likely to be made in the basic structure of
the state. More importantly, the nature of these reforms offers a good
indication of the character and intentions of the regimes that control the
state at given points in time.
The scope of national state activity extends over a broad range of human
endeavor, offering further proof of the status of the state as a major social
actor. Even so, there exist a more narrow array of primary or essential
functional tasks -- here referred to as "core" areas of state activity -- that
hold the attention of all regimes regardless of their particular character and
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organizational framework, degree of bureaucratic entrenchment, and mission of
specific agencies, the influence of larger contextual factors such as wars,
international economic conditions, natural disasters, etc., and/or the need to
maintain intact certain branches of the national state. For example, Foreign
service and national defense agencies, although evidencing changes in policy
orienta-tion under different regimes, often remain organizationally stable
regardless of regime change or basic differences in regime type. The
requirements of consistent diplomatic relations and national security
frequently outweigh demands for the structural overhaul of the foreign service
and military branches, particularly when regimes are confronted by more
pressing domestic concerns that require a more immediate response from or
reform within the agencies responsible for them, or need to maintain diplomatic
relations or military postures whose disruption can be ill -afforded at a
particular juncture in time. Although this is not always the case, the point
remains that depending on the specifics of context and circumstance,
organizational reform is most likely to occur in branches of the state
connected with pressing domestic issues rather than in externally-oriented
agencies.
This fact transcends national boundaries. Witness, for example, the
general congruence in the organization of the foreign service and military arms
of such dissimilar political systems as are those of the U.S. and the Soviet
Union. Here the organizational differences between the two political systems,
as well as the basic differences in regime type, are most evident in those
areas concerned with the internal ordering of society rather than in those
involved in maintaining their external positions. Even so, if we move to a
microanalytic level of analysis along the lines I am about to propose, we are
able to identify certain organizational traits in these externally-oriented
branches that help to further distinguish between the character and orienta-
tion of the two regimes.
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"core" or primary areas in which organizational features and change are most
significant (and likely to occur), I shall now propose a methodological
framework with which to undertake an analysis of national state organization
in detailed, yet comprehensive fashion.
Despite their respective inadequacies as explanatory frameworks for
analyzing the specific structure of the national state apparatus in relation
to regimes (since they seldom have bridged the gap between theory and praxis
or managed to associate organizational change within the state to regime type
and regime change), we can extract from the collective literature on
bureaucracies, comparative public administration, complex organizations, and
the state several dependent variables that when combined within a single
analytic construct accomplish what each could not do alone. To do so, we must
group these variables within a methodological framework that combines a
structuralist-functionalist approach with a micro-analytic and diachronic
focus.
The structuralist-functionalist aspect of this approach has been alluded
to at some length over the preceeding pages, and specifically refers to the
emphasis accorded the structure and function of branches of the state involved
in "core" areas of activity. The diachronic focus refers to the fact that the
analysis should be taken over time and (if applicable) across regimes. This
will allow observers to better relate organizational change within the
national state apparatus to the context in which such changes occur, and
specifically to the regimes that sequentially gain control over it. Finally,
the microanalytic orientation implies the use of several dependent variables
grouped into three broad organizational categories that constitute the essence
of complex organizations such as the national state apparatus. These
categories are structure, budget, and personnel.
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variables and the questions that guide the analysis must be viewed in light
of the general context and specific circumstances surrounding a regime's
emergence and subsequent consolidation, as well as the evolving systemic
factors mentioned earlier. This allows us to see how regimes define and
approach particular "core" areas, the influence this approach has on the
state's role and orientation, and the impact the structure and functions of
state organizations in "core" areas consequently has on the society at large.
By doing so, we are able to draw a revealing picture of the character and
intentions of the regimes in question.
Using this type of framework, traits such as linear, radial, or pyramidal
organizaton and authority hierarchies, centralized or decentralized formula-
tion and implementation procedures and networks, sectoral reorganizations and
transfers, directive or non-directive budgetary flows within and across
agencies, and general personnel characteristics all take on an importance
beyond that of mere administrative descriptors in the public sector. Each of
these variables tells us something about the regime that is shaping them.
It should therefore not be surprising to see that the resurgence of
interest in the state has brought with it questions about the relationship
between regime type and specific forms of national state organization. More
precisely, it appears that there is a close "elective affinity" between regime
types and the different types of structual frameworks erected within the
national state apparatus, and that this affinity is a product of design rather
than chance. For example, much has been written about the centralized versus
decentralized hierarchical structures of the Soviet and U.S. States,
respectively. In both cases, the structure of the national state apparatus is
perceived to be a direct reflection of the political regimes governing each
country. Though there is relatively little on the subject, we can hypothesize
17
superimposing of functions and responsibilities, and a cliental istic
orientation. At a budgetary level, the financial autarchy exhibited by
individual branches of the state apparatus fosters a competitive process of
resource allocation among them.
Bureaucratic authoritarian regimes^- 7 promote a highly formalized
pyramidal hierarchical structure culminating in a unitarian concentration of
power within the military-controlled executive branch that serves as the apex
of the state, and in which national political authority is divided, often
unequally, among the different services of the armed forces. Formal links
with civil society are narrowed considerably, while informal links with
privileged sectors of society are strengthened. Unhindered by the competing
pressures exerted by civil society at large, policy formulation and decision-
making authority is delegated to sectoral or technically-defined elites
within the regime. The organizational framework exhibited by the state
apparatus is marked by functional rationalization and a de-concentration of
responsibilities, an efficiancy-based orientation, the use of parallel
hierarchies for control purposes (with military hierarchies paralleling normal
civilian bureaucratic channels), and the adoption of principles of subsidarity
(where the state takes a secondary role to the private sector and more local
jurisdictionss in designated areas of endeavor). Military and ideological
criteria dominate the personnel recruitment process, which among other things
results in a purge of civilian personnel in many agencies. Budgetary
authority is vested in planning agencies connected to the executive branch,
and subsequently designated according to authoritarian (i.e. non-competitive)
allocation procedures. Normative autonomy within branches of the state is
low, owing to the concentration of decision-making authority in the hands of
the military leadership and selected regime elites, while operative autonomy
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exception of the afore-mentioned resource extraction, internal control, and
security branches, budgetary allocations are reduced across the board, and are
directed towards personnel related outlays in control agencies rather than
infrastructural improvements (with the exception of defense). Depending on the
crisis preceeding the installation of these regimes, direct military control
down to the departmental level in key areas is sometimes substituted for
parallel control hierarchies.
Populist authoritarian regimes award emphasis to those "core" areas of
the state involved in maintaining domestic order and providing public goods.
This entails not only expansion on all three organizational levels of the
agencies involved in these activities, but of the very definition of these
activities as well. This includes a general broadening of the state's
"paternalistic" role in society, centralization of control and decision-making
authority at all levels within the national state apparatus, emphasis on
"external" service- related functions rather than "internal" administrative
agencies, and the subordination of local jurisdictions to the requirements of
national programs. Personnel recruitment procedures tend to be highly
ascriptive, cooptive, and ideologically motivated in more political agencies
(such as national labor administration), but much less so in technical
agencies with only indirect political functions (such as national health
administration). Budgetary expansion in all areas is accompanied by irregular
allocation procedures dominated by personal is t and political expedient
criteria.
Limited democratic regimes^ couple broad budgetary restraint in all
areas with administrative decentralization, functional compartmental ization,
professional and merit-based recruitment patterns, emphasis on personnel-
related outlays over capital expenditures, and a narrowing of the state's role
that respects provincial and local jurisdictional authority in accordance with
21
national contexts. Finally, at a time when a large portion of the academic
community find themselves at odds with the policy-making sector over the
substance and course of foreign policy, this may well offer a means of
reconciling scholarly rigor and objectivity with the pragmatic orientation
that (should) underlie policy decisions taken with respect to foreign
political regimes.
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7Among others sharing this view, see L. Binder, et al
.
, Crisis and
Sequences in Political Development . Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1971; J. La Palombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development . Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963; and F. Riggs, Frontiers in Development
Administration . Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1971.
8Weber, "The Fundamental Concepts of Sociology," op. cit .
, pp. 154-155.
9The notion of "rules of the game" elaborated here is derived from that
offered in V.N. Perez-Diaz, State, Bureaucracy, and Civil Society . London:
MacMillan Press, 1971, p. 95.
10Skocpol, op. cit . , p. 24.
1*1 do not mean to imply that in all cases this involves the pluralist group
competition, free regular elections, and institutionalized political
uncertainty associated with liberal democracies. In non-representative, non-
competitive regimes such as those dominated by a party or the military,
external systemic pressures are translated into dynamic interplay within the
dominant elites, who translate the outcomes of this intra-group competition
into structural reforms within the state. The evolutionary nature of the
state apparatus under the seemingly monolithic regimes in China and the Soviet
Union attests to the dynamism and pervasivness of structural change under
stable political regimes regardless of their specific character.
l^We might compare, for example, the Albanian, Bulgarian, Chinese, Cuban,
Rumanian, and Yugoslavian states.
l^Skocpol, op. cit
.
, contains a bibliographic review of the major recent
works in this vein. Also see Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State:
Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," Comparative Politics
,
V. 16,
N. 2 (January 1984), pp. 223-252; and the reply to Krasner by Howard H.
Lentner, "The Concept of State: A Response to Stephen Krasner," Comparative
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^According to Oszlak, "patrimonial ism is the domination of one
individual, who requires functionaries to exercise his authority ... all
government positions originate in the administration of the monarch's or
dictator's domestic community. Although in modern times he assumes the role
of president or the equivalent, and surrounds himself with formal democratic
institutions, he exercises in fact a quasi-monopoly over all decisions related
to the appointment, replacement, transfer, or demotion of officials at all
levels of government." "Politicas Publicos y Regimes Politicos," op. cit .
,
p. 42.
^Regime Change and State Development in Postwar Argentina . Chicago:
Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago,
1985.
2^By "limited democratic," I refer to an elected, civilian regime that
exhibits all the formal characteristics of liberal democracies, but which due
to the circumstances of the electoral competition that preceeded its instal-
lation (when certain political groups were excluded from participating) is
not fully representative of the polity in question. This was the case with
both the Frondizi (1958-1962) and Illia (1963-1966) regimes in Argentina, and
applies to such as the Duarte regime currently governing El Salvador.
21"The notion of democratic regimes attempting to provide institutional
frameworks within the state with which to promote the structural bases for
democratic class compromise is derived from arguments offered by Adam
Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, "The Structure of Class Conflict in
Democratic Capitalist Societies," American Political Science Review , V. 76, N.
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